How the Aviation Safety Reporting System Undercounts Non-Towered Close Calls
Without controllers, voluntary pilot reports are the only record.

The Aviation Safety Reporting System undercounts non-towered close calls because voluntary pilot reports cannot replace an independent professional observer. At airports without controllers, an encounter can go unwitnessed by anyone outside the aircraft involved and never enter the safety record. That creates a structural blind spot in the U.S. National Airspace System.
What ASRS is and how it was designed to work
NASA administers the Aviation Safety Reporting System, or ASRS, as a confidential, voluntary, non-punitive channel for reporting aviation hazards. It accepts reports from pilots, controllers, dispatchers, cabin crew, ground operations personnel, maintenance technicians, and UAS operators. Its reach extends beyond the flight deck. The system has received more than 2.1 million reports over its history, providing a way for operational knowledge to reach people outside the organization or crew that first encountered a problem.
The ASRS Program Briefing describes four design pillars, including voluntary submission, confidentiality of identity, non-punitive protection, and independent administration. It identifies 14 CFR 91.25 and FAA Advisory Circular 00-46F as the framework for the program’s protections. NASA’s role separates the receipt and handling of reports from the FAA and employers. That separation supports the system’s purpose by giving participants a protected channel through which to disclose mistakes, hazards, and close calls.
Before the crash of TWA Flight 514, a United Airlines flight had narrowly escaped a similar outcome, but information shared within United had not reached the wider aviation community. ASRS gave people a way to share such warnings. In professionally staffed operations, several participants can independently recognize the same hazard and submit accounts from different positions. The system can therefore draw on more than one person’s willingness to report.
The explicit caveat NASA itself attaches to ASRS data
NASA explicitly warns that ASRS reports are not a measured random sample of aviation events. The ASRS Non-Tower Airport Incidents report set states that reports concerning a particular topic cannot be used to infer its prevalence within the National Airspace System. Reports are voluntary and are not independently corroborated by NASA, the FAA, or NTSB.
NASA also warns that reporting biases are not fully known or measurable. Awareness of ASRS and willingness to use it vary across the aviation community, so reporting culture may account for a concentration of near midair collision reports. Conversely, a sparse record cannot establish low risk. The reports show a minimum number of dangerous encounters, but they cannot show how many more occurred or reliably tell how often they happen.
Why non-towered airports structurally suppress the report that would otherwise be filed
At a towered airport, a controller can observe a close call independently of the pilots involved. Either the controller or a pilot can submit an ASRS report, and the controller works within a professional reporting context. ASRS itself remains voluntary for both. The important distinction is that a pilot’s decision not to report does not necessarily remove the event’s only route into a safety record.
At a non-towered airport, that independent observer is absent. Both pilots may recognize an encounter, but there is no controller to corroborate their accounts or initiate a separate record. Neither pilot is required to use ASRS. For aircraft equipped with a radio, there is also no specific FAR requiring calls on the common traffic advisory frequency, or CTAF, at non-towered airports. An encounter can therefore happen without the pilots sharing what they are doing over the radio or filing a report afterward.
When an aircraft is unidentified, it is harder to get another account of the encounter. It may not respond on CTAF, may depart in the opposite direction, or may never be on frequency. Although its pilot could independently report, the other pilot has no identified counterpart from whom corroboration can be sought. If neither files, there is no controller’s account to preserve the encounter.
This is a structural loss of redundancy. The missing controller removes an independent witness, the opportunity for professional corroboration, and an institutional reason to create a record. Voluntary pilot reporting then becomes the remaining channel described by these records. ASRS’s protections can encourage a submission, but they cannot generate one when the people involved do not recognize the hazard, do not know the program, or choose not to participate.

What the ASRS records that do exist from non-towered airports reveal about recurring failure patterns
NASA’s September 2025 ASRS material describes a DC3 first officer’s account of a developing ground conflict at a non-towered airport. The crew announced an intention to depart on runway XX, a downhill runway used under its standard operating procedure because of the aircraft’s size and the slope away from the airport. Normal traffic-pattern arrivals called for runway XY. The account documents differing runway-use expectations within the same operating environment. It reached the record through a participant’s description.
Other reported encounters identify aircraft that did not respond on CTAF, opposite-direction departures, and traffic that was never heard on frequency. A radio call may tell others what one aircraft plans to do without showing that another pilot heard or understood it. Where the other aircraft remains unidentified, the resulting account also lacks an identifiable second perspective.
An ASRS analysis found that a majority of aircraft interactions in its non-towered dataset involved a near midair collision or ground conflict. Most incidents resulted in evasive action by pilots to avoid a collision. These are findings about the reported dataset. They do not establish the proportion of all non-towered operations that involve conflict, nor do they show that every encounter had the same cause.
The report set’s June 17, 2026 update provides a sampling of non-towered incidents. Each account exists because someone submitted it. How many comparable encounters ended without a submission, leaving no record from which their circumstances could be examined, remains unresolved.
Why the absence of a tower means these events go unwitnessed at the moment they matter most
Runway-incursion capture at towered airports does not depend solely on a pilot’s retrospective account. Trained staff can use radar and position data to watch events and decide how to classify them. An incursion can therefore enter the record even when no pilot files with ASRS. Observation and voluntary disclosure are separate channels.
Non-towered airports have no controller to record events this way. When two aircraft approach a runway at the same time, their pilots must recognize and resolve the developing conflict without a tower controller watching it unfold. The ASRS analysis describes encounters in which pilots took evasive action, but avoiding a collision does not ensure that the event gets recorded. If no participant reports, the encounter may leave no contemporaneous professional account of positions, geometry, or severity.
A pilot’s account can explain what that pilot perceived, but it does not replace an independent observer’s view of both aircraft. Nor can a retrospective narrative supply radar geometry that was never available through a tower-based observation process. The two airport populations are therefore not measured by the same instrument.
The DOT Inspector General found that the FAA lacks an integrated approach to analyzing runway-incursion data and identifying risks. Available analysis was largely airport-specific, while limited causal data constrained broader work. That finding establishes weaknesses even after an event has been captured. At non-towered fields, the prior problem is more basic because the independent capture mechanism itself is missing.
What the reports that do surface suggest about the true scale of non-towered close calls
The vast majority of U.S. public-use airports have no towers, and only a small share of U.S. airports have physical control towers. The observation gap therefore extends across a broad airport population. It is not confined to a few exceptional sites. The supplied evidence establishes that the conditions favoring underreporting are widespread.
Severe runway incursions, classified as Category A and B, increased in 2025 even as total runway incursions declined about 1%. A reduction in the aggregate count did not coincide with a reduction in the most dangerous categories. Those figures show why total counts alone cannot tell how severe the events are.
DeKalb–Peachtree Airport in Atlanta topped the nationwide raw runway-incursion count between 2021 and 2024. It is a towered airport. Its position illustrates that substantial recorded conflict can occur where professional observation exists. Without an exposure measure, a raw count also cannot establish a comparative event rate.
Non-towered ASRS reports show that dangerous encounters keep happening, and the way reports are collected leaves room for similar events to go unrecorded. A low count at an unobserved field cannot be read as evidence of superior safety. The size of the unseen population remains unresolved precisely because the means of counting it is incomplete.
Why adding a controller's eye at non-towered airports changes what gets recorded
Digital towers let a trained controller watch a field that lacks a professional witness, without the need for a conventional physical tower. High-definition cameras, digital displays, and sensors provide a continuous panoramic view of runways, taxiways, and surrounding airspace. The intervention adds an observer. That observer can recognize a conflict independently of the pilots and place it within a professional operational context.
The FAA announced operational digital towers at Bartow Executive Airport in Florida and Kenai Municipal Airport in Alaska on November 6, 2026. Cameras provide a continuous 360-degree view that controllers use to manage traffic at these first U.S. The Florida Department of Transportation paid for Bartow’s system.
The program names five more non-towered airports that are to get digital towers. They are Winter Haven Regional Airport and Venice Municipal Airport in Florida, Montgomery County Airpark in Maryland, Johnston Regional Airport in North Carolina, and Durango-La Plata County Airport in Colorado. The Working Families Tax Cut Act funds those deployments. It set aside money for digital towers at non-towered airports that qualify through the FAA Brand New Air Traffic Control System initiative.
The path to those deployments was not straightforward. The FAA issued an Operational Viability Decision for the remote tower system at Leesburg Executive Airport in Virginia in 2021, allowing it to continue managing traffic without a backup tower. The developer withdrew in 2023, citing no reasonable path for approval, and the FAA terminated operations that year. That earlier operation is distinct from the November 2026 deployments under the newly approved program.
Infrastructure requirements also shape where the technology can be used. Under current FAA guidance, the network must be closed and physically point-to-point, with an independent fiber-optic feed between the sensors and control center. Wireless transmission is not permitted under that guidance.
What digital tower coverage does and does not resolve about the ASRS undercount
Digital towers bring in a professional witness where there was none before. They do not, by installation alone, create a mandatory reporting obligation or repair the FAA’s analytical framework. New observations can still enter the fragmented infrastructure identified by the Inspector General. Better capture and better analysis are related but separate requirements.
Non-towered reports repeatedly identify CTAF non-compliance as a contributing cause, and practitioners have called for enforceable CTAF usage at uncontrolled fields. Technology alone does not make that change. A controller can see more of what happens without settling the rules on what aircraft must transmit.
Coverage also depends on what the sensor suite can detect. Ultralights, gliders, and certain experimental aircraft are not required to carry or use a radio, and transponder-less traffic cannot be assumed to appear through cooperative surveillance. Non-cooperative surveillance is needed to detect that traffic without relying on its transmissions. A digital tower’s presence is therefore not, by itself, proof that every aircraft category is fully represented in its surveillance picture.
The thousands of non-towered airports without digital tower coverage still have no independent professional witness. Bartow, Kenai, and the five airports next in line represent the beginning of coverage. ASRS can continue to reveal hazards at unequipped fields, but its voluntary accounts cannot establish the full population of encounters.
The policy response should be sized to the hazard. That requires recognizing that a sparse record cannot establish safe operation, while preserving ASRS’s role as a source of candid operational accounts. Professional observation is now technically possible without a conventional tower. The unresolved safety gap lies between that capability and the large population of airports where it has not been deployed.
Sources
- ASRS Database Report Set Non-Tower Airport Incidents
- NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) Program Briefing
- ASRS CALLBACK Issue 548 - September 2025, Non-Towered Airport Hazards
- ASRS Database Report Sets - Aviation Safety Reporting System
- Issue 555 April 2026
- ASRS CALLBACK Issue 555 - April 2026, 50 Years of Turning Safety Reports Into Safer Skies


